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Spiritual startup My Tirth India shuts down ops due to lack of funds

EntrackrEntrackr · 10m ago
Spiritual startup My Tirth India shuts down ops due to lack of funds
Medial

Spiritual tech startup My Tirth India announced on Monday that it is shutting down operations due to a funding crisis. This news comes as a surprise, given that spiritual tech has emerged as one of the hottest sectors, even though the funding environment has been tight for others. In the past 15 months, over a dozen startups in the spiritual tech space have mopped up more than $40 million. My Tirth India is a pilgrimage and darshan site which used to enable tours to India’s top religious destinations by bringing temples, priests, hotels, travel agents, astrologers, ayurveda, and yoga to one platform. “..we have tried to generate as much employment as possible across cities, villages and towns encouraging people to rediscover their culture, traditions and heritage. But it’s with utter sadness that we finally have to shut down the office due to the lack of funds after the unfortunate demise of our principal shareholder and mentor,” said Indraneel Dasgupta, co-founder and CEO of My Tirth India. According to My Tirth India, it raised nearly $1 million from the late Subrata Roy who was the company’s principal shareholder and mentor. Roy was the founder and managing director of Sahara India Pariwar. Currently, singer Anup Jalota is My Tirth India’s chief mentor. Founded in 2019, the firm also launched spiritual membership programmes for travelers, and spiritual showrooms in cities like Lucknow, Varanasi, Kolkata, Noida, and spiritual products like agarbatti, dhoop, puja samagri, havan samagri, and idol, among others. According to industry reports, the Indian travel industry accounts for 10% of the country’s GDP. About 65% to 70% of the entire volume is contributed by spiritual tourism. As per data compiled by TheKredible, astro and spiritual tech startups have rmore than $40 million in the past 15 months. The notable names include Ustav App, DevDham, InstaAstro, AstroTalk, Vama, and Melooha also raised decent funding during the period. SriMandir’s parent company AppsForBharat is also in talks to raise $15 million in a new round. Entrackr exclusively reported the development in May.

Powerless but profitable: How Google India evades accountability

EntrackrEntrackr · 8m ago
Powerless but profitable: How Google India evades accountability
Medial

In a legal filing, Google India Private Limited clarified its limited role as a mere operational arm of Google LLC, while claiming to have no authority over key services such as YouTube, Ads, Search, G Suite, Google Play Store and others. Google India claimed it only operates as a “non-exclusive reseller” of the Google Ads program in India and functions solely as a support entity, according to a judgment by Bombay High Court in August 2021. A lawyer representing Google India took a similar stance while arguing in the case of Dinkum Data Solutions Private Limited v. Google India, heard on October 14, 2024, at the District Court of Gurugram. The lawyer argued that Google India lacked authority regarding the GSuite email service dispute, contending that Google LLC, as the relevant entity, should be included in the case. Based on this argument, the judge directed the petitioner to add Google LLC as a party to the proceedings. Entrackr attended the court proceedings in person. This revelation sparked concerns among Indian businesses, which face challenges addressing issues locally due to Google India’s lack of control and accountability over the very products and services driving their operations in India. Entrackr also analyzed the petition filed on 24 August 2021 by Google India, (Google India Pvt. Ltd vs. The Bombay Talkies Studios And Ors) where it was emphasized that Google India“does not act as an agent” for Google LLC. Instead, it operates independently, providing only limited support without control over crucial decision-making and management functions tied to Google’s services. In simple words, Indian users and businesses who encounter problems with Google’s services have no alternative but to address these issues with Google LLC, based in the United States. This logic seems flawed and no longer tenable, as Google India reported over Rs 28,000 crore in gross ad revenue with substantial profit in FY23. Thus, even as the firm continues to generate hefty revenues from India, its local operating entity’s toothlessness to provide adequate support or resolve issues for its clients here is beginning to grate. A burden for Indian businesses This limited role Google Indiapresents costly challenges for local companies as Google LLC has no offline presence nor any support team in India. When problems arise, Indian businesses find themselves forced to engage with the teams based in the US or approach legally, a process that can be both time-consuming and financially burdensome. Making one wonder if this was designed to be deliberately so. Thus, unresolved issues often end up in long legal proceedings—a last resort that no business wants to pursue unless absolutely necessary. The situation has also put a heavy financial and operational strain on India’s judicial system. Court cases involving support from Google can take years to conclude, and while a company waits for a resolution, its business continues to suffer, which means that essential matters like data access, service continuity, or even payment processing might be halted, impacting the business’s viability. Vasundhara Shankar, Managing Partner at Verum Legal, explained, “It’s true that Google LLC, the main U.S.-based entity, lacks a direct physical or ‘offline’ presence in many countries, including India, despite generating substantial revenue from these markets. India’s evolving regulatory landscape could introduce more stringent requirements, potentially compelling tech giants to expand their legal and operational footprint within the country.” Google India’s position: local support only Google India has reiterated its limited jurisdiction in its petition, stating that it “maintains a principal-to-principal relationship” with Google LLC and does not operate any core product platforms, such as YouTube or Search, within India, as per the judgment cited above. The petition underscores that any complaints or regulatory actions involving Google’s core services should target Google LLC, which controls all operational and decision-making powers for all services being rendered in India, to its customers. This structure effectively shields Google India from being held accountable for issues stemming from Google’s main services in India. Despite generating substantial revenue through ad sales and other indirect income sources, Google India lacks the authority to directly address concerns from Indian businesses and users. Its position as a support entity means it has no sway in policy changes, customer complaints, or dispute resolutions, leaving Indian businesses to navigate these issues independently or seek costly, time-intensive legal recourse. The larger regulatory debate This situation comes against the backdrop of an ongoing dispute with the Competition Commission of India (CCI) regarding Google’s alleged monopolistic practices, such as requiring device manufacturers to pre-install Google apps on Android devices, a practice criticized as anti-competitive. The CCI’s scrutiny reflects India’s need for regulatory clarity as global tech giants continue to consolidate influence in the Indian market. However, Google India’s limited powers highlight a structural challenge: how can local regulators ensure accountability when decision-making authority resides in another country? This challenge highlights the urgent need for a robust regulatory framework to address foreign tech subsidiaries’ responsibilities within India. Many Indian businesses argue that if Google India can derive revenue from the Indian market, it should be empowered to address local grievances. Otherwise, the accountability gap leaves Indian businesses and consumers to deal with extended service disruptions and limited avenues for redress. Toward a new regulatory paradigm? Google India’s petition cited above may set a significant precedent for tech companies operating in India through foreign parent entities. As more global tech giants establish Indian subsidiaries, it raises a pressing question: should these entities have greater accountability if they are conducting business locally? The answer has implications not just for Google but for the wider landscape of international tech companies that have entrenched themselves in India’s economy. Importantly, in case of social media firms like Google , Meta and others, the argument of India being a small market in the context of global revenues does not hold, as due weightage needs to be given to user base as well, where India is a key market for most, if not all. There is a growing call for the Indian government to mandate that major tech companies empower their Indian subsidiaries with greater authority to handle disputes and service issues. Such a policy would not only bolster consumer protection but also ensure that these corporations remain directly accountable within Indian jurisdiction, aligning with the country’s push for digital sovereignty and data localization. For now, Google India’s legal stance underscores a need for Indian businesses to carefully consider the limitations of subsidiaries in resolving disputes. And until legal and regulatory changes catch up, Indian businesses continue to bear the brunt of an arrangement that shields Google’s parent company from direct accountability, while their operations suffer in the absence of swift and effective resolutions.

No hurry to sell, indefinite horizon on Zomato holding: Sanjeev Bikhchandani

EntrackrEntrackr · 1y ago
No hurry to sell, indefinite horizon on Zomato holding: Sanjeev Bikhchandani
Medial

Info Edge, India’s largest and most storied recruitment portal, has had a stellar run in the last three years with its portfolio company Zomato’s market cap surging almost 2.3X since its stock exchange debut. The firm’s bet on fintech unicorn Policybazaar is also paying off well. The company has made it clear it is in no hurry to book profits on these investments, even as it continues to nurse its own brands beyond Naukri to profitability. The firm, one of the few to survive the dotcom boom and bust cycle of 2000, has been led by founder and chairman Sanjeev Bikhchandani for a large part of this journey. And today, Bikhchandani has earned the right to be looked up to as the statesman for the sector. Entrackr caught up with Bikhchandani in his Gurugram office and he spoke on a range of topics including Naukri, Info Edge’s investments, serial entrepreneurs and corporate governance. Here are the edited excerpts. As a listed firm that carries a heavy overhang from its investment portfolio, does it worry you that it might impact the valuation of the core Naukri business? Not really. Institutional investors are smart. We give them adequate data so that they analyze Naukri thoroughly before making a conclusion about valuation. We don’t run Naukri for valuation every day or month or quarter. We look at how we create value for our shareholders in the long run. And that’s how we run our businesses. So, this hypothesis about our core or even group business doesn’t stand. Info Edge has been an investor in Zomato for over 14 years and despite the latter’s share price rising nearly 14o% from its listing price, Info Edge didn’t sell its shares. What level of return are you anticipating from Zomato? Actually, we don’t calculate Investment Return Rate (IRR). Info Edge invested in Zomato because of our conviction that it could become a great company. And if you are convinced about your conviction then it will happen. So, IRR is the happy incidental outcome of investing early behind companies that you want to help. That’s my belief. We are not in any hurry to sell and have an indefinite horizon. Every VC firm has a fund cycle and pressure to return capital to their limited partners but that’s not the case with Info Edge as you are investing from your own balance sheet. Could you elaborate on this? That pressure does not make this choice. We have a long term horizon and we call it patient capital. To be a successful early stage investor in India, you have to be quite patient because companies take anywhere between 10-15 years to go to IPO from seed stage. So if you have funds for only 6-10 years, you will not realize the full fruits of your investment. If you have a 20 year fund, you tend to perform better. However, such a horizon could be possible only when you’re investing from your own whole balance sheet. Do you believe that Blinkit could become bigger than Zomato? I think both are large but Blinkit is going to be fairly large. If we look at Zomato’s quarter-on-quarter numbers, online food ordering appears to have stagnated in top 10-15 cities. What’s your take on this? Obviously, there is the base effect. But, we don’t see stagnation. Also, you need to compare year-on-year, not quarter-on-quarter. When YoY numbers are compared, there is growth. I think full fiscal year performance is more important than quarter. We used to commonly hear about Naukri’s recruitment business that it was not the online presence, but your sales force or feet on the street that made the difference. Does that still hold true? Online sales have never been a big part of our strategy. When you want to sell more expensive products, you need face-to-face contact. At Naukri, we have clients whom we bill several crore rupees for annual subscription and such accounts need heavy offline touch. While the product will be consumed online, the stuff around it very often will be offline. Over the years, several players have tried to crack the recruitment business in the blue collar segment but most of them died. What are the challenges in the segment? Blue collar segment has broadly three challenges. First, it’s hyperlocal. The job seekers in this segment don’t move to different cities as they look for opportunities in and around their locality. Second, very often there isn’t a detailed text CV which makes the process slow and inefficient. Third, potential workforce in the segment do not search for jobs on the laptop and use vernacular languages. They are mostly on mobile. So you’ve got to adapt to all these things and still somehow get revenue and profit. We have been trying to get inroads in the blue collar segment for over two years now but we have just started monetizing it. Our future position in the segment depends on monetization. Some of the celebrated entrepreneurs are launching a second or third company without their first startup churning profit. How do you see this trend? I think this isn’t a progressive trend. As an entrepreneur, you need to focus on one thing and do really well. Once you’ve cracked that you can add on a second thing in the same company. Over the past couple of years, we have witnessed corporate governance issues with some startups. Even Info Edge saw serious lapses at 4B Networks. What’s your opinion about this? By and large, my belief is that 95-98% of Indian founders are genuine but there will be a few bad examples. Investors make sure that when something wrong happens in their portfolio, it is highlighted and actions are taken to ensure that such incidents do not repeat. Any governance issue isn’t good for anyone including limited partners, investors, founders and the startup ecosystem. What factors contributed to the lack of success with Info Edge’s e-commerce investments 99labels, MyDala, and Happily Unmarried? Limitation of raising foreign direct investment (FDI) and heavy investment into competition were two major reasons for failure of 99labels while MyDala had a product market fit (PMF) issue. Happily Unmarried is now a part of VLCC and we are still a shareholder there.

Virat Kohli-backed WROGN’s revenue dips 29% in FY24

EntrackrEntrackr · 10m ago
Virat Kohli-backed WROGN’s revenue dips 29% in FY24
Medial

Virat Kohli-backed men’s apparel brand WROGN’s parent company has been struggling to grow, as the company’s revenue dropped by over 29% in the fiscal year ending March 2024. At the same time, the firm’s losses surged by 28.2%, nearing the Rs 57 crore mark during the same period. WROGN’s revenue from operations dwindled 29.2% to Rs 243.75 crore during FY24 as compared to Rs 344.3 crore in FY23, its consolidated financial statements sourced from the Registrar of Companies show. For background, WROGN reported a flat scale in FY23. The firm also generated Rs 21 crore from interest and gain on financial assets which took its overall revenue to Rs 264.8 crore in FY24. Founded in 2014 by brother-sister duo Anjana and Vikram Reddy, WROGN is engaged in the business of trading outdoor products such as apparel, footwear, and accessories among others. Leveraging Kohli’s influence, the brand has rapidly expanded its presence through exclusive brand outlets and strategic partnerships with marketplaces. On the expenses front, cost of materials formed 53.6% of the total expenses. This cost slid 29% and stood at Rs 163.91 crore in FY24. Employee benefits expenses also saw a dip by 7.5% to Rs 32.26 crore during the same period. Significantly, the employee cost also includes ESOP expenses worth Rs 1.96 crore. Commission paid to the selling agents was down by 28% in FY24 at Rs 30.83 crore while other expenses such as advertising promotions and legal & professional fees also shrank significantly. In total, the overall expenditure of the company went down by 24.7% to Rs 305.56 crore during FY24 from Rs 405.6 crore in the previous fiscal year. For the complete expense breakdown, head to TheKredible. WROGN tried to cover up its losses by taking cost-cutting measures but due to the sharp fall in collection, its losses increased by 28.2% to Rs 56.76 crore during the year against Rs 44.26 crore in FY23. Its operating cash outflows, however, improved by over 63% to Rs 5.23 crore during the year. Its outstanding swelled to Rs 636.58 crore as of FY24. As per TheKredible, the firm’s EBITDA margin and ROCE stood at -6.04% and -72.07%, respectively. On a unit level, WROGN spent Rs 1.25 to earn a rupee of operating revenue during FY24. FY23-FY24 FY23 FY24 EBITDA Margin -4.42% -6.04% Expense/₹ of Op Revenue ₹1.18 ₹1.25 ROCE -25.49% -72.07% Aditya Birla’s TMRW recently picked up a 16% stake in WROGN at a $105 million valuation by pouring in Rs 125 crore or $15 million. It’s worth noting that Aditya Birla also acquired a similar brand Bewakoof in December 2022. WROGN has raised around $90 million from the likes of Accel, Flipkart, Kohli, and Sachin Tendulkar since its inception in 2014. In November 2020, Flipkart invested an undisclosed amount in WROGN’s Series F round. The e-commerce major is also an investor in Hrithik Roshan’s HRX which competes with WROGN. According to TheKredible’s D2C report, fashion (apparel, jewelry, footwear, eyewear, and accessories) is the largest category attracting a large set of consumers. India’s fashion industry is booming, with the potential to reach $43.2 billion by 2025. But seeing how anaemic or even negative the numbers have been for most, one can only marvel at the outlier that a Zudio has been over the last two years with its triple-digit growth. Of course, the broader slowdown in the category has been blamed on multiple possible factors, including a craze for investment in the stock markets directly or indirectly. Or perhaps the prioritisation of getting an iPhone over other branded products, considering the rise in iPhone sales in India. Either way, WROGN’s numbers indicate a problem it has acknowledged for some time now, and is making efforts to manage. The challenge it faces is as tough as any pitch Kohli has played on, one suspects.

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